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NOTES
RECENT CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL
OVER ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS OF DECISIONMAKING
A series of recent cases of the United States Courts of Appeals evince
an increasing judicial willingness to overturn decisions of administrative
agencies on grounds seemingly unrelated to the substantive merits of the
particular decision in question. The emphasis instead has been on alter-
ing, in certain situations, the methods by which the agencies make deci-
sions.
The federal courts have traditionally overseen the decisions of ad-
ministrative agencies. However, the usual role has been for courts to
intervene only infrequently, and even then only for the purpose of revers-
ing administrative determinations on their merits under the guise of
settling questions of law.' Recently, however, the courts, in the absence
of statutory guidance, have been increasingly willing to assume a super-
visory role over the process, as opposed to the product, of administrative
decisionmaking.2 As a key component of this supervision, the courts
1. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e) provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Consequently, a reviewing court will, in an appropriate case,
label as a "question of law" the proper relationship between various factors that the
agency must consider in performing its appointed task. The court will then determine
that the law which the agency must thereafter accept as given is a certain fixed relation-
ship among these factors. This approach is illustrated by Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). By statute, the Secretary of Transportation
was prohibited from authorizing the expenditure of federal funds to finance high-
vay construction through public parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route
existed. 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f) (1970); 23 id. § 138. Finding "law to apply" by
looking "primarily to the statutes themselves" rather than an "ambiguous" legisla-
tive history, 401 U.S. at 412 n.29, the court rejected the agency's argument that a balar-
cing of the various factors in determining what was "prudent and feasible" was to be left
to the agency's discretion. Rather, public parks were to be preserved "unless there were
truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or community disruption
resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes." Id. at 413.
The traditional test for determining when a court should step in and label a given
determination a question of law to be decided by the court has been described by Profes-
sor Jaffe as one hinging on "clear statutory purpose":
[W]here the judges are themselves convinced that certain reading, or applica-
tion, of the statute is the correct-and only faithful-reading or application, they
should intervene and so declare. Where the result of their study leaves them
without a definite preference, they can and often should abstain if the agency's
preference is "reasonable."
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 572 (1965) (emphasis in orig-
inal) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
2. This is possible because the administrative process, while growing larger in its
proportion to the totality of government in the recent past, seems never to have received
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are insisting upon a shift in the power relationship among the parties
involved in the administrative process.'
This note will discuss: the judicial techniques for imposing changes
in the agency's decisionmaking methodology; the effect of these changes
upon the functioning of the administrative agency as a decisionmaking
institution; and the probability that these developments will significant-
ly change the overall substantive results of the administrative process.
JUDICIAL INSISTENCE ON SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS FOR DECISION
One of the recently imposed court requirements is that, in appro-
priate cases, administrative determinations should be predicated on rela-
tively permanent decision criteria,4 or standards, developed by the
agency for general application. This requirement demands that admin-
istrative procedures provide for the formulation of a general policy5 as
a firmly grounded constitutional sanction, nor a well developed theoretical base vis-a-vis
the traditional three branches of government. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMIISTvATIVE PRO-
cEss 2 (1938). See also note 113 infra.
3. The potential parties involved in the administrative decision can be categorized
as follows:
(a) The judiciary.
(b) The administrative agency or institution with all its multifarious di-
visions, branches and interest groups.
(c) The "primary" public group or groups involved-that group or those
groups with reference to whose behavior the administrative process of the in-
volved agency was instituted to affect (to promote, control, structure, etc.).
"Group" itself is a term of degree. Generally, a set of individuals or organi-
zations can be called a group to the extent that their individual objectives are
predominately affected in the same direction (positive/negative) by the admin-
istrative decision at issue. Thus, it is clearly possible to have more than one
primary group involved in a given administrative decision (e.g., the railroad
and trucking industries in an ICC determination of railroad freight rates). It
is also possible to have no primary group distinguishable from the public gen-
erally with respect to a given administrative determination. This is especially
true with "line" as opposed to "regulator" agencies. See M. SHAPIRO, THE
SUPREME, COURT AND ADMNISTRATIE AGENCIES 5-9 (1968).
(d) The "secondary" public group or groups involved in the specific case.
Such groups generally become involved in the formal administrative decision
process at their own initiative. This is so even though the administrative
process was not instituted to affect them per se, except to the extent that the
collective legislative judgment may have had their specific interests in mind
when legislating in the "public interest." Nevertheless, they feel that their
interests will as a practical matter be so significantly affected by the admin-
istrative decision that it is worth their while on some subjective cost/benefit
calculus to participate in the formal process.
4. The term "decision criteria" is from Grundstein, Administrative Law and the
Behavioral and Management Sciences, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 121 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Grundstein]. Involved here is the agency doing for itself what the courts have tradi-
tionally done under the guise of settling questions of law. See note 1 supra.
5. Usually, over some range of decision options, value elements which are relevant
to the decision in question conflict; one value is achievable to a greater degree only at
the expense of others. Consequently, these values must be structured in terms of
priority into a goal set or social preference function.
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a prerequisite to decisions which necessarily involve significant conflicts
among important social values. The correctness of a particular policy is
not the issue.
Within limits, the administrative agency is free to develop a pre-
ferential relationship among competing values.' However, there is an
increasing tendency for the courts to insist that soine policy determination
be made, be publicly known, and be followed reasonably consistently by
the agency. The concern is not so much what the "law" is as that some
law is properly developed.
Recent decisions illustrate two alternative judicial methods for
achieving this result. One of these judicial techniques is to insist that the
agency, prior to resolving the particular issue before it, develop decision
standards applicable to all analogous situations. After standards have
been developed, the agency may decide the case at hand, but the result
must rest upon the general standards.
This method was utilized in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus.' In that case, the administrator had refused a request of
an environmental interest group to issue a cancellation and summary
suspension order for the registration of DDT under the Federal Insect-
Such values are ultimately ranked not only as a result of their intrinsic desirability,
but also because most ends or goals at least partly affect more final ends which must be
considered. See H. SIMON, D. SMITHBURG, & V. THompsoN, PUBLIC ADmiNisTRAT oN
58-59 (1950). Thus, the value elements that conflict will to the extent feasible be struc-
tured in a way that tends to achieve a perceived "higher" objective. But see note 78
infra.
Policy development is then a determination of a preferential relationship among a
set of conflicting values stated in terms of behavioral objectives. See, e.g., note 25 infra
where the desired value of general public input into public broadcasting translates into
the behavioral objective of providing for reimbursement of secondary group intervenors
in license renewal proceedings. The question becomes to what extent shall the behavior
unit (in this context, the agency) pursue value A, thus cutting against value B, or con-
versely, what is the minimum extent to which value B must be served, thus setting limits
on the potential achievement of A? Doubtless in many specific instances this is done
in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the value premise of cost minimization was to be served to
the extent that costs of "extraordinary magnitudes" were not to be incurred, thus setting
limits on the achievement of the "preservation of parkland" value. Thus, at some fixed
point costs will be deemed to be "extraordinary" and the conflicting value no longer to
be pursued, rather than having a sliding scale function where an acceptable level of cost
will be at least partially a function of the amount of the other value (preservation of
parkland) expected to be achieved. The "qualitativeness" of much policy development
seems more a function of the relative crudeness of our technology, both in scaling values
and in measuring the cause and effect relationship between them, than of any intrinsi-
cally different logic.
6. The "law"-the standard to govern administrative decisions-reflects both the
agreed upon social hierarchy of values and a strategy for achieving or pursuing such
values in a factual setting.
7. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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icide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.8 By the terms of the statute, the
Secretary may begin a procedure to cancel the registration of a poison
when it appears that the poison does not comply with the required statu-
tory standards.9 In addition, FIFRA provides that the Secretary may
suspend the registration of a poison pending the outcome of the cancella-
tion process when it appears that a suspension is "necessary to prevent
an imminent hazard to the public."'"
The Ruckelshaus court characterized the suspension question as in-
volving "both factual determination and the application of a legal
standard."" The factual question required a determination of the extent
and probability of harm occuring in the interim between the issuance of
the cancellation notice and the conclusion of administrative proceedings.
Legal standards must then be applied to evaluate these factual deter-
minations. The court held that the statute "entrusted to the Secretary in
the first instance" the task of formulating standards for suspension. 2
In establishing these standards, the agency must ascertain the risks from
which Congress intended the public be protected. It was the court's task,
however, to ensure that appropriate standards were in fact developed and
were used in deciding individual cases. The Secretary
has an obligation to articulate the criteria he devolops in making
each individual decision. We cannot assume, in the absence of
adequate explanation, that proper standards are implicit in every
exercise of administrative discretion."3
This decision was then remanded to the Secretary with instructions tco
consider whether the information presently available to him
calls for suspension of any registrations of products contain-
ing DDT, identifying the factors relevant to that determina-
tion, and relating the evidence to those factors in a statement
of the reasons for his decision. 4
Clearly then, the court in Ruckleshaus was mandating the develop-
8. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FIFRA].
9. The procedure begins by the Administrator (formerly the Secretary) issuing a
"notice of cancellation" which then results in a set of investigations and hearings re-
quired for a final determination of the legal status of the poison-whether it is suitable
for registration. Id. § 135b(c).
10. Id.
11. 439 F.2d at 595.
12. Id. at 596.
13. Id.
14. Id. The court added that "[i]t may well be, however, that standards for suspeh-
sion can best be developed piecemeal, as the Secretary evaluates the hazards presented
by particular products." Id.
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ment of substantive decision standards by the administrative agency.
The court held that the agency must enumerate the relevant factors-
i.e., the competing values which will be enhanced and discounted in the
decision.' 5 It must then arrange these factors in a patterned relation-
ship to provide a guide for decisions in specific factual situations. 6
Within limits, the administrator is free to lay down any boundary cri-
terion that will subsequently discriminate between "satisfactory" and
"unsatisfactory" choice areas,' but he must do so before deciding a
specific case.
A second judicial method of requiring administrative decision
standards is illustrated by Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC."8 There, the reviewing court essentially employed a stare
decisis approach in its reversal of the administrative decision, and re-
quired the agency to follow its own "past precedent."
Petitioner was a public interest organization which had provided
technical and legal assistance to several community groups seeking to
persuade the Federal Communications Commission to deny the license
renewal request of an allegedly racially biased local television station.
While the issue was pending before the FCC, petitioners, the community
groups and the station came to an agreement whereby the station promised
15. Id. This list of relevant factors will itself be judicially reviewable under the
"abuse of discretion" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(A) (1970). Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
See also note 102 infra (discussion of judicial interpretation of "abuse of discretion").
16. What is called for may be something along these lines: We will pursue value
A (e.g., the economic benefits deriving from allowing the poison to be used), even though
it cuts against value B (e.g., expected negative public health effects) so long as condi-
tion C (e.g., a "substantial" economic reliance on the poison-perhaps required to
be defined in quantitative terms) is met, and so long as condition D (e.g., no sub-
stantial evidence-again perhaps defined in quantitive terms-that the poison is car-
cinogenic at normal levels of exposure) is not met.
17. Setting a decision criterion or standard with respect to any given value is equiv-
alent to setting a requirement with reference to that value which must be met for the
overall agency decision to be acceptable or satisfactory. Thus, the process of setting
decision standards with respect to the various values involved is in fact the process of
setting agency goals. This becomes particularly evident when one considers that achiev-
ing goals ultimately entails eliminating or avoiding that set of conditions which we do
not desire. By setting decision standards, and thus "requirements," the agency defines
those outcomes it will deem socially undesirable and eliminates the possibility of such
outcomes resulting from its decisions. The foreclosure of these conditions thus becomes
the "goal."
It is doubtful whether decisions are generally directed toward achieving
a goal. It is easier, and clearer, to veiw decisions as being concerned with
discovering courses of action that satisfy a whole set of constraints. It is this
set, and not any one of its members, that is most accurately viewed as the goal
of the action.
Simon, On the Concept of Organizational Goal, 9 AD. Sci. Q. 1, 20 (1964) (emphasis in
original).
18. 465 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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that it would meet the programming needs of minority groups, and the
local groups agreed to withdraw their petition to deny renewal. A pro-
vision of this agreement stated that the station would reimburse petitioner
church for its expenses incurred on behalf of the local organizations.
However, when the request for approval of the reimbursement came be-
fore the FCC, it was denied, and the agency announced a general policy
against reimbursement of intervenors who seek to block license renewals
when reimbursement is a condition of settlement with the station. The
court held that the FCC's determination and policy announcement in this
case could not be sustained. 9 The court justified its decision by citing:
(1) the "spirit" of the relevant statute as determined by past Commission
decisions; (2) the Commission's past precedent expanding the allow-
ability of reimbursement; and (3) other Commission precedent generally
favorable to "public interest" intervention.21
This judicial opinion seems indistinguishable from the general ap-
proach employed by an appellate court when it reverses a lower court
determination on a point of hitherto undecided law. Citing precedent and
arguing by analogy, the court held that the agency was bound to give
determinative weight to its own earlier decisions and declarations of
policy concerning competing values.
It has long been clear that stare decisis has a role to play in the
process of administrative decision and judicial review." The usual
occasion for invoking its authority, however, has been when an indivi-
dual's rights would be prejudiced by the agency's deviation from past
policy, and even then, the case is usually remanded to the agency to give
it the opportunity to articulate a reasoned explanation for its failure to
apply past precedent.22 In United Church of Christ, however, the agency
was compelled to adhere to its past precedent, and was given no oppor-
tunity to articulate reasons justifying its change in policy. This was done
in the name of public interest values involved in the agency decision.23
This particular judicial technique will of course not always be ap-
propriate. There is impressive judicial precedent holding that "admini-
strative authorities must be permitted, consistent with the obligation of
due process, to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing
19. The court held that once the Commission had determined that the public in-
terest group seeking to withdraw was bona fide, and that the terms of settlement with
the local broadcaster serve the public interest, then voluntary reimbursement of legiti-
mate expenses of the groups could not be forbidden. Id. at 527.
20. See id. at 524-28 & nn.21-39.
21. See Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative
Process, 28 FoRD. L. Rxv. 1, 70-71 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Kramer].
22. See, e.g., FTC v. Crowther, 430 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
23. See 465 F.2d at 524-28 & nn.21-39.
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circumstances." 24 Even in such cases, however, the agency must be able
to articulate in a reasoned manner why a change in the policy will better
serve an appropriate higher value.25
It is apparent that judicial insistence that an agency give more
weight to its own precedent achieves the same general result as insistence
upon the development of a priori administrative standards. With either
approach, the result is that a generalized policy determination is made,
is publicly known, and is followed more or less consistently by the agency.
JUDICIAL INSISTENCE ON PROCEDURAL STANDARDS
As an alternative to mandating the development of substantive deci-
sion criteria, courts are also beginning to impose a less restrictive decision-
making methodology which centers around two major procedural vari-
ables: (1) hearing requirements, and (2) record development require-
ments."8
Hearing Requirements
Federal courts are increasingly willing to overturn administrative
decisions on the grounds that more stringent hearing requirements
should have been applied during the agency's determination of issues
involving important social values. These requirements have generally
been imposed on the theory that they will force an agency to consider the
effects of its decision on the values raised by secondary interest groups.
Even though substantive standards for reaching decisions are not neces-
sary, a hearing requirement confines administrative discretion since the
agency must, in the factual context of a specific case, formally consider
the values raised at a hearing in terms of their relative priority.
Where an agency's statutory mandate requires administrative deter-
24. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968).
25. It must be seen that a given decision usually involves both interpreting facts and
structuring values to achieve an end that is usually best termed a subgoal or an end that
will serve as a means to a higher end. See note 5 supra. Reimbursement of expenses in
FCC litigation, in appropriate cases, is an end which structures several value premises
in the context of the particular case. But it is also obviously aimed at a higher or more
ultimate end-it is thought to be the most appropriate means to achieving a higher goal
(secondary group input into station operating behavior) which itself may become a
means at another level of analysis.
26. Another important component of this evolving judicial approach is the relaxed
requirements for standing and intervention, favoring "public interest" participants. The
evolution of standing has been sufficiently chronicled elsewhere. Baude, Sierra Club v.
Morton: Standing Trees in a Thicket of Justiciability, 48 IN. L.J. 197 (1973). Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), is the latest, if somewhat cryptic, Supreme Court
treatment of the subject. Citations to most of the major commentary in the field are
found therein. On intervention see generally Comment, Public Participation in Federal
Administrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 702 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment].
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minations to be "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,"2
the Administrative Procedure Act" directs that a trial-type hearing be
held.2" In other situations not covered by the APA, less formal public
hearings may be required by the specific statute establishing the agency,
or by administrative regulations."0
Where a formal, trial-type hearing is required by the APA, there
may be a question of whether every element of the decision must be deter-
mined in the context of such a hearing. Recent cases have indicated that
in marginal situations when "public interest" values are concerned, a
hearing will be required.
One such case is Moss v. CAB."' There, a series of ex parte meetings
were held between members of the Board and representatives of the air-
line industry concerning proposed increases in domestic passenger fares.
As a direct result of these meetings, the Board issued a detailed outline
of the rate structure it proposed to accept. Thereafter, the airlines filed for
increases based on the Board's proposed formula. When these fares were
allowed to stand, the petitioners, some 32 Congressmen, charged that
the Board had effectively "determined" rates without satisfying the
statutory procedural requirement of holding public hearings 2 and without
taking into account the rate-making factors enumerated in the statute.
The Board in defense argued that simply announcing the structure it
proposed to accept was not a determination of rates within the meaning
of the statute. The court rejected this argument as well as an alternative
one that volatile economic conditions in the airline industry justified this
expedited and informal procedure." The court characterized the basic
27. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) ("rule making" proceedings) ; id. § 554 ("adjudication"
proceedings).
28. Id. §8 500-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 [hereinafter referred to as APA].
29. Id. 8§ 556-57 sets out the APA requirements for formal trial-type hearings.
30. E.g., 23 C.F.R. pt. I, Appendix A (1970), implementing 23, U.S.C. § 128(a)
(1970).
31. 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
32. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1482(d), (e) (1970). Under the usual statutory procedure, air-
line passenger rates charged by the airlines must be filed with the CAB and then only
those rates can lawfully be charged. Id. §§ 1373(a)-(b). An airline may change an
existing rate by filing a new fare schedule with the Board. Id. § 1373(c). However,
by its own motion or on complaint the Board may suspend the new rate while under-
taking an investigation of its lawfulness. Id. § 1482(g). In this investigation, following
public notice and hearing, id. § 1482(d), the agency is to apply statutory criteria deline-
ated in id. § 1482(e) in determining the reasonableness of the proposed rate changes and
in requiring any adjustment it found to be necessary.
In Moss, by issuing a "fare formula" not arrived at after public notice and hearing
and decision on the record, and announcing it would accept without suspension, rates
filed by the airlines "implementing" that formula, the agency was obviously utilizing a
procedure that was not foreseen by the statute and which undercut some of its pro-
cedural policies.
33. 430 F.2d at 900-01.
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problem as involving
the recurring question which has plagued public regulation of
industry: whether the regulatory agency is unduly oriented
toward the interests of the industry it is designed to regulate,
rather than the public interest it is designed to protect.3"
The court proceeded to overturn the agency determination. While noting
that this was an arguably marginal case, 5 it stated that a public hearing
should have been held on the proposed rate structure."6
Other recent court decisions have dealt with other dimensions of
hearing requirements. In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v.
Volpe,37 one of several reasons for reversing and remanding the Secre-
34. Id. at 893.
35. "lIt is true that the practice followed in this case does not fit neatly and
precisely into the statutory concept of rate-making by the Board or by the carriers'
Id. at 902.
36. Id. at 902. Clearly, the public hearing was required so that the agency would
be forced to confront the effects of its decision on "public interest" values.
[W]e emphatically reject any intimation by the Board that its responsi-
bilities to the carriers are more important than its responsibilities to the public.
Board action must always comply with the procedural requirements of the Stat-
ute and must always be based on an assessment of the relevant available data,
with due consideration given to all the factors enumerated in the Statute, which
factors taken together make up the public interest.
Id.
The set of sometimes conflicting values which Congress considered as making up
the "public interest" were
(1) The effect of such rates upon the movement of traffic;
(2) The need in the public interest of adequate and efficient transportation of
persons and property by air carriers at the lowest cost consistent with the
furnishing of such service;
(3) Such standards respecting the character and quality of service to be ren-
dered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to law;
(4) The inherent advantages of transportation by aircraft; and
(5) The need of each carrier for revenue sufficient to enable such air carrier,
under honest, economical, and efficient management, to provide adequate and
efficient air carrier service.
49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
37. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
In an earlier decision on this same case, D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970), Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing only for himself
at this point of the majority opinion, went so far as to characterize the public hearing
requirement as a "fundamental right" which, once granted by Congress to the public
generally, could perhaps not be constitutionally withheld from some groups.
[T]hese provisions of Title 23 are the only form of direct citizen partici-
pation in decisions about the construction of massive freeways, decisions which
may well have more direct impact on the lives of residents than almost any
other governmental action. . . The Supreme Court has made it clear in a
series of cases that the right of effective participation in the political process
"is the essence of a democratic society, and any restriction on that right strikes
at the heart of representative government."
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tary of Transportatioi's determination regarding the location and con-
struction of a bridge on an interstate highway network was a failure to
comply with hearing requirements set down in Department of Transpor-
tation regulations. The regulations required public hearings to be held
on the issue of project location."8 Although such a hearing had been held
in 1964, the Secretary's approval of the project did not occur until 1969."
Although several different bridge locations were considered in the 1964
hearings, the project approved in 1969 differed from all of them. Even
then, however, only a maximum location variance of 1500 feet and a
minor redesigning of traffic ramps and interchanges was involved.
The district court had held that a new hearing was not required to
satisfy the regulations because 'the change in plan was "so insubstantial
that the public would not be affected any differently than [it would] by
the original proposal which formed the basis for the first hearing....""
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals refused to accept this
determination, however, since it was not clear from the lower court record
whether it had made a finding of fact on the possible effect of the change
in the proposal.4 Remanding for a factual determination, the court
stated, "it is entirely conceivable to us that the differences in the plans
would, in fact, have a substantially different impact on persons on both
shores."4 Thus, in a situation where significant conflicts among im-
portant values are likely to be involved, the court will insist that the
required hearing deal precisely with all the important issues.
Yet another dimension of the hearing requirement, the sequence of
the decisionmaking process, was the subject of recent litigation concern-
ing a 1970 FCC policy statement.4" The statement announced that sub-
We of course recognize that the right to participate in a highway hearing
is not the exact equivalent of the right to vote on the project. However, the
similarities between voting and the public hearing are strong. The purpose and
the effect of a hearing may be the same as those of a vote. Both are designed
to elicit the wishes of the "electorate."
Id. at 441-42 (citations & footnotes omitted).
What remains undeveloped here is an explanation linking the equal protection analy-
sis approach underlying the above, see id. at 439-42 & nn.7-16, 24-27, to federal action.
38. 23 C.F.R. pt. I, Appendix A (1970), implementing 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970).
39. This delay was due at least partially to a complex litigation and legislative his-
tory. Congress apparently attempted to reverse D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968) with Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 827 (1968).
Subsequent litigation ensued. D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 308 F.
Supp. 423 (D. D.C.), rev'd 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir.), on remand, 316 F. Supp. 754
(D. D.C. 1970), rev'd, 459 F2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
40. 459 F.2d at 1243, quoting D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 316
F. Supp. 754, 779 (D. D.C. 1970).
41. 459 F.2d at 1243.
42. Id.
43. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
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sequent hearings on broadcast license renewals would follow a two-step
approach. There was to be an initial determination of the licensee's "sub-
stantial service to the community" in which challengers would be per-
mitted to appear only to call "attention to the incumbent's failings."" If
the Commission were to find at such a hearing that the incumbent did
indeed have a record of "substantial service" to the community, he would
be entitled to a renewal regardless of any promised superior performance
by a challenger. Only if the agency found a lack of "substantial service"
would a full comparative hearing considering competing license applica-
tions be held.45
In Citizens Communication Center v. FCC the court rejected this
proposed procedure, although it admitted the strong congressional pres-
sure for its adoption."' The court held that a new applicant must always
be given the chance to make the comparative showing necessary to dis-
place an existing licensee.48 At first glance this may seem to be an in-
dividual rights and fairness decision,49 yet the court left no doubt as to the
public interest considerations lying behind its determination:
As new interest groups and hitherto silent minorities
emerge in our society, they should be given some stake in and
chance to broadcast on our radio and television frequencies.
According to the uncontested testimony of petitioners, no more
than a dozen of 7,500 broadcast licenses issued are owned by
racial minorities. The effect of the 1970 Policy Statement,
ruled illegal today, would certainly have been to perpetuate this
dismaying situation.5"
Thus, as in the situations discussed above, the court insisted upon
public hearings thereby relying on the values and arguments to be raised
by secondary interest groups5 to force the agency to consider the effects
Appliants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
44. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
45. Id.
46. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 1210.
48. Id. at 1213.
49. That is, the statutory right of prospective new licensees to receive a full com-
parative hearing under the Ashbacker doctrine. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326
U.S. 327 (1945).
50. 447 F.2d at 1213-14 n.36.
51. In this case the concepts of primary and secondary groups seem to run together.
See note 3 supra. Obviously a challenger in a license renewal proceeding, motivated by
a hope of obtaining the broadcast license for himself, is a paradigm example of what has
been termed a "primary group." The court here, however, was obviously concerned
with protecting the rights of one primary interest group (license challenger) at least
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of its decision on such values. The court is not insisting that the values
of a given secondary group must "win" in a specific case, but that they
must be considered in a formal, open manner. 2
Development of the Record
Functionally interrelated with the hearing requirements discussed
above is an increasing judicial insistence on an adequate development of
the administrative record. Requiring a hearing where secondary groups
are allowed to raise interests that may be affected by administrative action
partly in order to protect what it perceived as currently underrepresented social interests
falling into a "secondary" classification.
52. This discussion of hearings has ignored the fact that the agency often has some
leeway when, under its statutory mandate, its exercise of rulemaking powers is not re-
quired to be "on the record," to alter the safeguards provided by hearing requirements.
It can do so by characterizing the decision as one of rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1970) rather than adjudication under id. § 554. This allows the use of the less strict
procedural requirements of id. § 553. The utility of doing this for the operating effi-
ciency of the agency per se has been extensively debated. See, e.g., Fuchs, Agency De-
velopment of Policy Through Rule-making, 59 Nv. U.L. REv. 781 (1965). But see Rob-
inson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rillemaking and Adjudi-
cation and Administrative Procedure Reforms, 118 U. PA. L. Rxv. 485 (1970).
If the rulemaking label is successfully applied in a given case, the nature of the
court's inquiry will indeed change to some extent. It will then be "addressed to different
materials" and
inevitably varies from the adjudicatory model. The paramount objective [when
reviewing rulemaking] is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legis-
lative task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the
dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of rules for general
application in the future.
Automotive Parts & Accessories v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). That the
court will retain power to scrutinize the result, however, and to intervene and require an
adequate explanation if it is certain that relevant values have not been spoken to, or fully
considered, seems equally clear.
We do expect that, if the judicial review which Congress has thought it
important to provide is to be meaningful, the "concise general statement of...
basis and purpose" mandated by [5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970)] will enable us to see
what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings, and
vhy the agency reacted to them as it did.
Id.
It also seems clear that more lies in the background here than simply congressional
intent in providing for judicial review. Something would seem to remain of the old non-
delegation doctrine.
[CIlearly, rule-making is the action of a body subordinate to the legislature.
That the same deference accorded "findings" of the legislature is not to be given
the findings of the Commission is implicit in the law governing legislative dele-
gation of authority. Were the "findings" of the Commission in a rulemaking
proceeding automatically exempt from judicial review, the law governing dele-
gation would also become little more than formalistic mutterings. . . . [T]he
Commission has broad discretion to seek a given objective either through ad hoc
adjudicatory proceedings or through rule-making. To argue that, if the latter
route is followed, judicial inquiry into the factual basis for the agency's action
is impermissible, is to say that in large measure the agency itself has the discre-
tion to determine whether, its action will be subject to meaningful review.
City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also note 110 infra.
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would be of less utility if the agency were not forced to address itself to
their arguments, and incorporate the values raised into the ultimate ad-
ministrative decision. Where the development of an administrative record
is required, as in formal, trial-type hearings, these social interests must
be considered by the agency and taken into account in the final outcome."a
Therefore, although the agency, consistent with "law and the legislative
mandate" has "latitude not merely to find facts and make judgments but
also to select the policies deemed in the public interest," it is becoming
increasingly common for the court to ensure that "the agency has given
reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues."4
As noted above, a record is required in many instances by statute
or regulation. However, even where no hearing of any type is required,
the use of the "adequate record" requirement is being expanded as a
judicial supervisory tool. Once the court decides that judicial supervision
is called for,55 it will ascertain whether the issues raised by the secondary
53. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 612
(2d Cir. 1965).
54. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Thus, judicial review of administrative determinations has increasingly focused on as-
suring
that the agency has given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and
issues. This calls for insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable
clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of the crucial facts,
a course that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate general stand-
ards, applied without unreasonable discrimination.
Id.
The benefits of this judicial insistence upon an adequately developed record are not
limited to the possibility of an altered judgment on the merits:
Reasoned decision promotes results in the public interest by requiring the
agency to focus on the values served by its decision and hence releasing the
clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice. It furthers the broad
public interest of enabling the public to repose confidence in the process as well
as the judgment of its decision-makers.
Id. at 852 (citations omitted).
55. The literature on the initial judicial decision to review an administrative deci-
sion has been engulfed by a running debate between Professors Davis and Berger over
the proper construction of the "committed to agency discretion" exemption of the APA,
5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). See, e.g., Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78
YALE LJ. 965 (1969) ; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable,
51 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1967) ; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51
MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967). The latest Supreme Court case on the subject, Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), resolves to some degree the con-
troversy by holding the exemption to be "a very narrow exception," id. at 410, citing
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLum. L. REv. 55 (1965).
The exception "is applicable in those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." 401 U.S. at 410 (citation
omitted). It is unlikely, however, that this single broad holding will resolve all the
problems in the area. For some of the considerations involved see Saferstein, Non-
revewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L.
REv. 367 (1968).
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group, even if raised for the first time in litigation, have been adequately
accounted for in a reasoned explanation.
One instance of this expanded use of the "adequate record" require-
ment is found in Environmental Defense Fund, Iw. v. Hardin," an
earlier phase of the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus
litigation discussed above.5" In Hardin the initial question was whether
the Secretary's failure to issue the "notice of cancellation" was judicially
reviewable. In effect, the Secretary had done nothing: he had made no
initial study of the poison's legality, and had remained silent in the face
of the environmental group's request. " The court found a meaningful
review of the Secretary's refusal to issue the cancellation order "'impos-
sible in the absence of any record of administrative action," 9 and re-
manded the case to the agency for an initial determination; "the basis for
that decision should appear clearly on the record, not in conclusory terms
but in sufficient detail to permit prompt and effective review."6 As a
result of the requirement of a detailed record, the agency is forced by the
court to speak to the issues raised by the petitioners.
An alternative approach in record development where none is re-
quired by statute or regulation was used by the United States Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe" in which the
petitioner sued to enjoin construction of an interstate highway authorized
by the Secretary of Transportation allegedly in violation of a federal
statute. 2 After construing the statute in question, the Court, in the
absence of an administrative record before it, was unable to determine
whether the agency had complied with it. However, the Court did not
remand the decision to the Secretary of Transportation for hearings and
56. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57. See text accompanying notes 8-14 supra.
58. 428 F.2d at 1099.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1100.
61. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
62. It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. . . . [T]he
Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of
any publically owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined by the
Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from
an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by such
officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of
such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize
harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic
site resulting from such use.
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) ; 23 id. § 138.
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a determination of formal findings on the record.6" Rather, it remanded
to the district court to consider any available administrative materials
("record") to see if the agency decision was justified.64 Noting, however,
that the "bare record ... before the Secretary at the time he made his
decision" might not include all of the factors he actually considered, the
Court concluded that the district court might have to require some ex-
planation in order to determine if the Secretary's decision was justified."
Specifically, the lower court could "require the administrative officials
who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining their
action."66
Thus, in examining the available administrative record, the lower
court will attempt to determine whether the factors raised by the inter-
vening groups were appropriately considered by the agency. If such a
determination cannot be made, the administrators could presumably be
forced to speak to such issues in testimony explaining their action.
The increasing importance of the administrative record (internal
documents, studies, correspondence, etc.) in instances where no formal
findings are required of the agency, but where the court will review the
ultimate decision is discussed in D. C. Federation of Civic Associations
v. Volpe. 7 Indeed, in that case, the court developed a near-presumption
against the validity of an administrative determination of a complex
question in the absence of an internal administrative record.
Our review of the Secretary's determination is hindered
not only by the lack of any formal findings, but also by the
absence of a meaningful administrative record within the De-
partment of Transportation evidencing the fact that proper
consideration has been given to the requirements of this sec-
tion. . . . [T]he complete non-existence of any contem-
poraneous administrative record is . . . serious. . . . [I]t
is hard to see how, without the aid of any record, the Secretary
could satisfactorily make the determinations required by statute.
The absence of a record, in other words, simultaneously obfus-
63. This was the approach advocated in the separate opinion of Justices Black and
Brennan. 401 U.S. at 421-22.
64. Id. at 420.
65. Id. The district court was, however, given the alternative of requiring the Sec-
retary to prepare formal findings speaking to the issues involved. Id. at 420.
66. Id. at 420. This clearly undercut to some extent the longstanding United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), holding against inquiry into the mental procesess of de-
cisionmakers.
67. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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cates the process of review and signals sharply the need for
careful scrutiny."8
Thus, from these various ways of reconstructing an administra-
tive record, even where no formal hearing or findings are required, the
courts can ensure that the administrative agencies consider the appro-
priate social values necessarily affected by their decisions.
THE EFFECT OF IMPOSITION OF PROCEDURAL STANDARDS
ON THE AGENCY AS A DECISIONMAKING INSTITUTION
The emphasis on public hearing requirements and judicial insistence
on the development of an adequate administrative decisionmaking record
are functionally interrelated. The utility of the public hearing is likely
to be great only if the agency is forced to speak to the concerns voiced
at a hearing and forced to rank such interests with other competing values
in reaching the ultimate decision. This result can generally be achieved
by requiring an "adequate record." Conversely, the utility of an ade-
quate-record requirement may be dependent on a public hearing require-
ment. 9 What constitutes an "adequate administrative record" in a
specific fact situaton will be partially a function of the issues which are
raised by the secondary public group. The agency, and the court itself
on review, are dependent on the secondary public groups to present
arguments and to marshal evidence concerning the extent to which im-
portant values are likely to be affected by a given decision. In situations
of extreme complexity, where cause and effect chains are likely to be
never ending, the focus of the agency and the subsequent scrutiny of the
court may be limited to those issues legitimately raised by the secondary
public groups.
This dependence by agencies and courts on public interest input
may aid in the explanation of the now famous language of Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. FPC.'°
[T]he Commission has claimed to be the representative
of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an
umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appear-
ing before it; the right of the public must receive active and af-
firmative protection at the hands of the Commission.
68. Id. at 1237-38 (citations omitted).
69. Such utility may also be dependent upon secondary group standing to argue
"public interest" considerations upon judicial review of administrative determinations
where no hearing is required.
70. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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. . . The Commission must see to it that the record is
complete. The Commission has an affirmative duty to inquire
into and consider all relevant facts.7
This language is somewhat deceptive. If read literally, it would impose
an awesome responsibility on the agencies and the courts to be certain
that all "relevant facts" have been considered, and that the record is in
this sense "complete. ' 72  Rather, the Scenic Hudson opinion should be
taken to mean that the agency may not merely listen to the arguments
on both sides and them simply announce its decision by reciting
all the evidence and arguments advanced by all the parties, and
then, without indicating any preference or choice, stating that
on the basis of all the evidence and all the arguments pro and
con and all the policy factors present, the following decision
is made.73
It is not possible to conclude from a recitation of "facts" which values
are and which are not to be enhanced. 4 In the absence of statutory stand-
ards, a political choice must be made by the agency. While the agency has,
within limits, discretion to rank values and develop policy in the context
of a given situation, Scenic Hudson says it must do so affirmatively and
publicly. Any actual decision must then be justified in terms of the policy
so developed.
Neither Scenic Hudson nor subsequent cases have specified a general
criterion for courts in determining which values or factors should be
woven into the rationale of a particular administrative decision. A reason-
able criterion would begin by focusing upon those factors"5 which second-
ary interest groups succeed in convincing the court should be legitimately
considered in light of both the general legal framework" and the specific
71. Id. at 620.
72. See Sive, Some Thoughts of An Eevironmental Lawyer in the Wilderness af
Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 638-39 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sive].
73. Kramer, suIpra note 21, at 69-70 (emphasis in original).
74. "Decision criteria are not inferences from evidentary proof and thus are not a
function of fact determinations." Grundstein, supra note 4, at 129.
75. Of course, the agency would also consider any legitimate factors traditionally
considered by it and those, if any, raised by involved primary groups.
76. Cf. Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA.
L. REv. 947 (1971) (arguing that the function of judicial review is not so much to check
for the "correct" expert decision as one of holding "expertness" accountable to more
generalized legal rules and public interest norms); JAFFE, supra note 1, at 590. Jaffe
argues :
[T]he statute under which an agency operates is not the whole law applic-
able to its operation. An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of
many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination of
the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each
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statutory purpose."' Next, from among this initial group of legitimate
factors, the courts should ultimately require the agency to consider only
those factors which will be significantly affected by the administrative
decision. Courts should require that significant impact be established by
substantial evidence, a burden which must be borne by the secondary
interest groups."8
agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law .... Thus
in the review of administrative actions a court may appeal to criteria of va-
lidity which have no specific locus in the statute.
Id. See also Sive, supra note 72, at 637-38.
77. Statutory purpose may itself in a given case lead to consideration of a broad
range of factors since the "goals" of the statute may in reality be the goals of many
different interest groups, all of whom were necessary parties to the political coalition
pushing the statute to fruition.
I Clearly one should not accept literally the stated goals of the law.
[M]ore often than not, important goals of the law are not set out in the text.
Any complex law arises out of a complex background; it is the result of com-
promise between interested parties. In the background of urban renewal there
were urban planners and reformers concerned about the shape and beauty of
cities. There were housing reformers eager to clear the slums. There were
mayors anxious for showpiece projects in their cities. There were spokesmen
for the poor, the middle class, and the rich. Even on paper, urban renewal is a
tangled web of compromises and reciprocal accommodations. The blunt po-
litical fact is that the program has no one overriding goal.
Friedman, Social Welfare Legislation: An Introduction, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 217, 219-20
(1969) (footnotes omitted).
78. It could be argued that this expanded public participation approach results in
issues being raised which are largely superfluous to the tasks entrusted to the adminis-
trative agency by the legislature. The argument is that the "correctness" of agency de-
cisions should be the prime judicial concern; the structuring of or failure to structure a
given set of values in an administrative decision should be evaluated only in light of
"rational" considerations. Thus, any given value choice (i.e., choosing to enhance, de-
emphasize or ignore altogether a value in the context of a specific fact situation) should
be evaluated in terms of "does this decision form a rational means to achieving the higher
goal as expressed by the statutory purpose." See H. SImON, ADMINISTRATIvm BEHAVIOR
62 (1957 ed.) [hereinafter cited as SIMON]. Indeed, this seems to be what is done by
the courts with the traditional approach of labelling a given value choice a "question of
fact" to be evaluated by the substantial evidence test, or by calling a given determination
an "application of a statutory standard" to a set of facts, which is to be judged by a "rea-
sonable basis in the law" test. See generally, Kramer, supra note 21, at 84-85.
There are two problems with this analysis considering the types of cases discussed
herein. First, the "higher goal" is often nonoperational; the connection between it and
the immediate value choice is only very vaguely if at all capable of evaluation in terms
of cause and effect. If the higher goal expressed in the statute is, for example, the
"public interest," then the decision to build a power plant at a given site, cutting against
aesthetic interests, cannot in any realistic sense be judged in terms of the decision ra-
tionally promoting the attainment of the higher value. The promotion of power generat-
ing capacity at the expense of aesthetic concerns has been identified by the agency as
the "public interest." It is the highest or ultimate goal in any operational sense.
Second, a given behavioral choice, structuring a set of immediate values in order to
affect a higher value may in fact have consequences for more than one means-end chain.
For example:
A relief policy, for example, in which family budgets are set at a very low
level in order to provide clients with an incentive to seek and accept private
employment, may also have as its consequences a high incidence of malnutrition
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Thus, contrary to the admonition of Scenic Hudson, it is precisely
more of an umpire's role"9 into which the administrative process is being
molded by these judicial decisions. As the courts lose faith in the ability
of the administrative agencies to adequately serve as advocates of the
various public interests, they are insisting upon a revised model for the
administrative process."0 The task of pointing out the values which are
likely to be significantly affected and of amassing evidence concerning
causal relationships is being increasingly entrusted to the secondary public
groups. The agency is being cast in the role of the formal decisionmaker
-still allowed to choose and to develop policy, but forced to confront
such values in the final choice.
An example of the extremes to which the courts are increasingly
willing to go in altering the nature of the administrative process can be
and disease among the families of relief clients. An acceptible policy cannot be
determined merely by considering one of these means-end chains and ignoring
the other.
SInaON, supra, at 75. Even though a given value choice may seem to rationally promote
the higher end expressed in the enabling statute, it may have adverse consequences for
other higher values which, even though Congress was silent on the point, logically seem
deserving of consideration in light of their social importance as expressed in the general
legal framework.
79. Cy. Williams, An Evaluation of Public Participation, 24 AD. L. REv. 49, 60-61
(1972).
Until a short time ago, it was assumed that the government agency itself
represented the public interest. In its proceedings and deliberations there was
conceived to be a two party adversary stance ....
• . . We no longer view our administrators as the sole representatives of
the public interest. They have been pushed into a somewhat quasi-judicial role
of more passively deciding among competing considerations. The adversaries
are the regulated business and economic interests on the one hand and the con-
sumer and general public on the other. These adversaries present their conflict-
ing points of view to the agency or administrator for ultimate resolution.
Id. See also Comment, supra note 26, at 723-30.
80. Cf. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966). In that case, now Chief Justice Burger considered the legal standing
of a "public interest" group to appear before the FCC in a license renewal proceeding:
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener
interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate
listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of
those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably
adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a
valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither
we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it.
Id. at 1003-04. He later stated:
Unless the Commission is to be given staff and resources to perform the
enormously complex and prohibitively expensive task of maintaining constant
surveillance over every licensee, some mechanism must be developed so that the




seen in Hanly v. Klehidienst where the court insisted upon public par'-
ticipation in the absence of any statutory or administrative provisions.
In Hanly, plantiffs alledged that the General Services Administration had
failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,82
and sought to enjoin the construction of correctional facilities in an area
of mixed residential, business and governmental activities.83 NEPA
requires a detailed environmental impact statement for every major federal
action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."'"
81. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as NEFA].
83. In the earlier case of Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), plaintiffs
had sought the same injunctive relief against construction on the grounds that NEPA
requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970), calling for a detailed environmental im-
pact statement for every major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," had not been met. The court had remanded to the agency for a
more detailed threshold determination of whether the proposed project was a "signifi-
cane' one in terms of affecting the quality of the human environment (which if it was
found to be, would trigger the mechanism requiring a detailed environmental impact
statement).
[T]he agency was required to give attention to other factors that might
affect the human environment in the area, including the possibility of riots and
disturbances in the jail which might expose neighbors to additional noise, the
dangers of crime to which neighbors might be exposed as the consequence of
housing an out-patient treatment center in the building, possible traffic and
parking problems that might be increased . . . and the need for parking space.
471 F.2d at 827.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
... (2(c)) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible officials
on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal of-
ficial shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency
which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the com-
ments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies,
which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards,
shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5 and shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review pro-
cesses; . ...
Id. §§ 4332 (2) (c) (i)-(v).
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A threshold determination of the GSA had concluded that the siting and
construction was not an action significantly affecting the environment and
thus did not require an impact statement.85 In Hanly, a challenge of the
adequacy of the threshold determination presented the court with the
question of determining the meaning of the statutory term "significant."
The problem, in the court's words, was that:
[W]e are faced with the fact that almost every major
federal action, no matter how limited in scope, has soqme ad-
verse effect on the human environment. It is equally clear that
an action which is environmentally important to one neighbor
may be of no consequence to another."8
The court decided that in the absence of "some rudimentary procedures
S.. designed to assure a fair and informed preliminary decision," an
agency "lacking essential information, might frustrate the purpose of
NEPA by a threshold determination that an impact statement is unneces-
sary."8 " Therefore, despite "the absence of statutory or administrative
provisions on the subject," the court held that
before a preliminary or threshold determination of significance
is made the responsible agency must give notice to the public
of the proposed major federal action and an opportunity to
submit relevant facts which might bear on the agency's thres-
hold decision. 8
Furthermore, the court said a full-fledged hearing must be provided in
some cases.
89
Clearly then, this case reveals a situation where the court believes
that a number of major values or interests may be involved in a given
administrative determination and these values must be considered and
balanced in the administrative record. Since neither the court nor the
agency can be certain which values will be significantly affected in the
context of a specific factual situation, the court will require public access
85. 471 F.2d at 827-28.
86. Id. at 830.
87. Id. at 835.
88. Id. at 836.
89. The necessity for a hearing will depend greatly upon the circumstances
surrounding the particular proposed action and upon the likelihood that a hear-
ing will be more effective than other methods in developing relevant informa-
tion and an understanding of the proposed action.
Id. See also A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1971). "The
law is only beginning to insist on provisions for oral testimony, in appropriate cases,
prior to the issuance of administrative regulations." Id. at 861.
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to the decisionmaking process, and insist that the agency "affirmatively
develop a reviewable environmental record" ' responding to those values
that are raised by secondary public groups. The agency must develop
policy, but which variables will be formally incorporated in that policy
will, in a given case, be partially a function of the legitimate values that
secondary public groups will raise.
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
Thus far, judicial insistence upon substantive standards on the one
hand, and public-influence oriented procedural standards on the other,
have been treated as entirely separate categories. However, it should be
recognized that the effects of the application of these requirements may at
some point become indistinguishable. In the first place, the various pro-
cedural requirements which mandate the development of policy with
reference to the values of secondary interest groups are likely to be in-
volved in any proceeding involving the development of generalized sub-
stantive standards. Second, the requirement of an adequate record in a
specific case will, as discussed above, result in an express policy deter-
mination which explains and justifies the particular administrative deci-
sion. If such a policy determination should be deemed entitled to some
stare decisis weight in subsequent analogous decision situations, the result
will approach the requirement of generalized substantive standards."'
Conversely, a court may lay down a requirement that agencies must
articulate substantive standards of general applicability in specific cases
from which they may subsequently deviate where appropriate. Appro-
priate cases would include those where the decision environment faced
by the agency has significantly changed or where the agency, in a reasoned
opinion, openly shifts its policy after demonstrating that its previous policy
was based on faulty reasoning or had led to unforeseen and undesirable
consequences. The effect of this court requirement is quite similar to re-
quiring an adequately developed record where the record states a policy
which is later given stare decisis weight. The difference between the re-
quirements is not one of kind, but it is rather one of the degree to which
the results and policies of one decision are generally applicable to sub-
sequent decisions.
The degree of general applicability that the courts will require of
90. 471 F.2d at 836.
91. When a court holds only that the agency must articulate its rationale in terms
of the specific facts of the case at hand, rather than in terms of standards which shall
apply to all foreseeable future cases, a decision criteria-a structured relationship in-
volving the significant values at issue in the decision-which is in some sense the
"law," if only for the given case, is being required.
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policies developed by the agency will depend upon the "manageableness"
of the problems with which the agency is attempting to cope. Variables
that seem likely to be involved here are: (1) the degree of agency
experience in the area; (2) the relative stability of the agency's deci-
sion environment; (3) the complexity of the decision environment as
measured by the availability of technology for measuring and evaluating
effects of alternative decisions on the values affected;2 and (4) the extent
to which the agency's statutory mandate has resolved the value conflicts
necessarily involved in the decision. The degree to which courts will re-
quire agencies to formulate general standards, either by procedural or
substantive means, should depend upon the court's assessment of these vari-
ables.
WILL IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?
Having indicated the greater supervisory role the courts are assum-
ing over administrative decisionmaking methodology, questions still re-
main about the effects of these requirements. Will their imposition change
the substantive results of agency decisions, or will the agency tend to
simply "recast its rationale and [reach] the same result?""9
To some extent, any probable change in outcome will be a function
of the general applicability of the standards required by the courts. The
more general the decision criteria, the more it will tend to confine future
agency choice given strict subsequent judicial scrutiny. An example of
the potential effects of relatively generalized standards can be seen in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, which followed the Hardin
-Ruckelshaus line of decisions involving the FIFRA."5 In Ruchelshaus
the court had required the agency to develop standards for governing ad-
ministrative decisions concerning immediate suspension of economic
poisons once a decision to issue the cancellation notice had been made."6
The criteria subsequently developed by the agency included
92. For a discussion of an area where such technology is only rudimentary if ex-
istent at all, and the consequent implications for the administrative process, see Tarlock,
Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645 (1972). It may be, how-
ever, that as technology improves, and as better models are built (making cause and
effect links between higher and lower order values better understood, see Boyer, Alterna-
tives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Eco-
nomic, and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. R:v. 111, 156-57 & nn.160-61 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as-Boyer], the decision problems may at the same time become more complex as
effects of a given decision on "higher order" values other than the one intended to be
affected are uncovered.
93. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
94. 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
95. See'notes 8-14, 56-60 sapra & text accompanying.
96. See notes 12-14 supra & text accompanying.
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The type, extent, probability, and duration of potential or actual
injury to man, plants and animals. . . measured in light of the
positive benefits accruing from, for example, use of the respon-
sible economic poison in human or animal disease control or
food production."'
The plaintiffs in Environmental Defense Fund brought suit to re-
quire the immediate suspension of two pesticides, aldrin and dieldrin,
for which cancellation notices had been issued. In its statement of reasons
for refusing the immediate suspension of the poison, the agency had dis-
cussed the immediate dangers involved in continued use of the poison,
but had not explicitly considered the benefits to be expected. The court
said of the standards developed by the agency:
We are not clear that the FIFRA requires separate analysis
of benefits at the suspension stage. We are clear that the
statute empowers the Administrator to take account of benefits
or their absence as affecting imminency of hazard.9
Since the agency had included an analysis of benefits in its previ-
ously developed standards, the court held the agency bound by such
standards in this instance. Analogizing the standards developed by the
agency to judicial standards involved in the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, 9 the court remanded to the agency for an explicit statement
of the benefits expected from a continued use of the poison which would
be weighed against the expected liabilities."' 0
It is hard to escape the impression that judicial supervision of the
administrative process makes a difference in this situation. The agency
will not easily be able to "recast its rationale and reach the same result."
It will have to speak to the issues embodied in the standards it has de-
veloped, and meet some minimum evidentiary burden to support its deci-
sion. The agency cannot manufacture evidence out of thin air, and must
always make findings with respect to any evidence presented by the "ad-
verse parties." '' Certainly, in relatively close cases, agency discretion
97. 465 F.2d at 535.
98. Id. at 538 (emphasis added & footnote omitted).
99. Judicial doctrine teaches that a court must consider possibility of success
on the merits, the nature and extent of the damage to each of the parties from
the granting or denial of the injunction, and where the public interest lies.
Id. at 539.
100. Id. at 541.
101. Where the court is convinced that secondary groups and the value interests
they raise have received hostile treatment at the hands of the ,agency, the court may
not only reverse the determination, but- also impose a final judgment. See Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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will be exercised. However, the possibility of judicial review involving
an evaluation of evidence in light of relevant standards..2 should make a
difference, at least as much as the threat of appellate reversal influences
any lower court determination on the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion.
While some of the effects of the judicially imposed requirements de-
pend upon the general applicability of the standards developed by the
agency, other effects are also predictable whenever such requirements
are imposed. First, as a result of a public ordering of the values involved
in the administrative decision, agency approval of a policy is known and
is visible to the interest groups affected by the policy determination. At a
minimum, if a given value is discounted0 3 in a reasoned, public statement
of policy, such a determination should be relatively more susceptible to
"legitimate" forms of political influence and control and less susceptible
to the "illegitimate.'
0 4
102. Evidentiary questions will be reviewed on the substantial evidence test, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970), if such findings are required by the APA to be made
pursuant to the "on the record" rule-making provision of the Act, id. § 553(C), or an
"on the record" adjudicatory hearing, id. § 554. The Supreme Court in Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), seems to have also said in dictum that
the substantial evidence test will apply even to the less formal modes of rulemaking
under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) when this is less than obvious from the face of the statute,
id. § 706(2) (E), providing for judicial review. 401 U.S. at 414. Otherwise the "abuse
of discretion" standard will usually apply, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970). See 401 U.S.
at 414. The Federal Courts of Appeals currently employ two different standards for re-
versal of administrative decisions for "abuse of discretion."
One interpretation equates "abuse of discretion" to the "clearly erroneous"
standard which calls for rather broad review of the findings made by a trial
judge [In Re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)1. Another, narrower
reading of the test would find an abuse of discretion only if the action "were
made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis . . ." [Wong Wing Hang v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966)]. Overton
Park somewhat unhelpfully cites cases stating both versions.
McCabe, Recent Developnents In Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A De-
velopmental Note, 24 AD. L. Rav. 67, 96 (1972). Obviously, the choice of tests used by
the court in a given case will affect the relative influence of the judicial techniques dis-
cussed in this note. Perhaps the test that will actually be used in a given case will be
pragmatically chosen, depending in part on such variables as the true need for "ex-
pertness" in evaluating the phenomena involved and the relative confidence of the court
in the integrity of the administrative process involved in the particular case.
[A]ssertions of discretion inevitably raise questions of degree which must be
appraised in the context of the relevant provisions of law and the nature of
the particular action sought to be reviewed.
Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
103. As indeed, some inevitably must be because values conflict. On the ubiquity
of social conflict see R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SocI-
ETY 157-206 (1957).
104. Cf. J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 22-23 (1962).
The revulsion against the revelations of pressure on the commissions from
businessmen, legislators, and executive branch has been too much concerned
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Second, to the extent that administrative decisions are "intendedly
rational" in terms of organizational objectives,' behavioral principles
would predict a change, to some degree, from the traditional results of
administrative choice. For example, agencies may, over time, become less
favorably oriented toward the industries which they are charged to re-
gulate. Professor Jaffe has commented on the administrative agencies
"maturing" over time, and becoming to some degree "captive" of those
social institutions intended to be the regulated.
[T]he phenomenon loosely and invidiously described as
"industry orientation" is much less a disease of certain ad-
ministrations than a condition endemic in any agency which
seeks to perform such a task. It is a product of our political
philosophy with its insistence on representation and the proce-
dure through which representation functions, of our legislatures
which are organized to register all significant groups, of our
statutes which grant powers so wide that solutions will be
much more the consequence of group interaction than of legis-
lative formulation. .... 106
It is not necessarily incompatible with Professor Jaffe's thesis to
argue that industry orientation could be described as a predictable con-
sequence of the old adversary model where agencies were expected to be
both arbiters and advocates of the public interest."0 Industry orientation
is, after all, simply placing a relatively high priority on those values ad-
vocated by the primary group and a low priority on conflicting values of
other social groups, if such values are considered at all. If the informa-
tion with which a particular decisionmaking institution is constantly con-
fronted is one-sided, if the arguments it has to meet and the values which
it must formally address derive predominately from one particular interest
group, we would expect, eventually, a relatively one-sided orientation.
with the symptoms and too little with the cause ... [A]s the administrators
sharpen their standards for decision, they will not only end the cruder forms
of influence from interested individuals, but also will reduce pressures from the
executive and from Congress . .. [T]his does not mean that there would or
should be an end to efforts to persuade agencies to alter rules that have become
outmoded, or are contended to be; but such efforts . . . would then be in the
open, and related to the rule rather than the case.
Id.
105. This phrase means essentially that administrators are conscientiously trying
to make the best decisions they can, given limited information and limited capacity to
process it. See generally SiifoN, supra note 78, at 38-41.
106. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 13.
107. See note 79 supra.
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This explanation is consistent with how this phenomenon might be an-
alyzed by a behavioral scientist.
[I]n actual behavior, as distinguished from objectively
rational behavior, decision is initiated by stimuli which channel
attention in definite directions, and . . . the response to the
stimuli is partly reasoned, but in large part habitual. The
habitual portion is not, of course, necessarily or even usually
irrational, since it may represent a previously conditioned ad-
justment or adaption of behavior to its ends.
Not only do the stimuli determine what decisions the
administrator is likely to make, but they also have a consider-
able influence on the conclusion he reaches. An important
reason for this is that the very stimulus which initiates the deci-
sion also directs attention to selected aspects of the situation,
with the exclusion of others.Y8
To the extent that this analysis is accurate, we should certainly ex-
pect different results over a period of time as secondary public groups
raise their arguments, and as the courts force the agencies to consider
such values in a formal way in context with those of the primary group.
This is not to say that any particular value will prevail in an immediate
case, or even over time, in the absence of legislative or executive inter-
vention. The point is that the values presented by secondary interest
groups should receive generally more favorable treatment and their
influence over the ultimate decisions should relatively increase.
Finally, we would expect administrative decisions gradually to be-
come relatively less binary and more reflective of the variety of interests
involved.' Many decisions need not ultimately be a "yes" or "no"
choice. Although the interests of the intervening secondary public groups
may not "win," their values nonetheless may be served to some greater
extent than would otherwise be true.
108. SimoN, supra note 78, at 91-92 (emphasis added). See also id. at 210-12.
109. For an example of this phenomena, compare the initial, rejected Federal Power
Commission decision described in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) with the ultimate outcome approved in Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971). See also, A Quaker Action
Group v. Hickel, 429 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970), which rejected a single value approach
focused on violence by requiring judicial examination of the feasibility of other regula-
tory provisions that would "provide satisfactory safeguards against violence with less
interference with the right of peaceful protest." Id. at 187.
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CONCLUSION
Currently the beginnings of a creative judicial approach regarding
administrative agencies can be detected. This approach ensures that the
decisions of agencies will become in some sense more democratic, that is,
more susceptible to influence by broader segments of the affected public,
and relatively more "law-like" by becoming more reasoned and consis-
tent."'0 This is not to maintain that we have arrived at the best of all pos-
sible worlds. One obvious problem with this evolving administrative
model is that not all of the affected public interests will have their view-
points argued before the agencies due to such obstacles as inadequate
time, money or information."'
A second limitation of this approach is that it will do nothing to
ameliorate the current problem of agencies being saddled with trial-type
procedures for making "management" decisions." 2 A "management"
110. As is many times true in the law of judicial review of administrative deci-
sions, it is not always clear to what extent constitutional elements, as opposed to optional
congressional grants of jurisdiction (making a given decision "reviewable,") compel a
given article III court's insistence on administrative standards for decisionmaking. It is
clear that some constitutional elements lurk in the background, however, either in the
form of the old "nondelegation" doctrine, perhaps still alive to some degree, see Amalg-
amated Meat Cutters & Butchers Work. v. Conally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D. D.C. 1971),
or in some "rule of law" substitute therefore. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 6-8.
Indeed, Judge Bazelon in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), specifically referred to the Davis argument that a "standards"
requirement may be a functional, and a more workable, substitute for the old nondelega-
tion doctrine. Id. at 598 n.55, citing K. DAvis, DIscRETIoNARY JusTiCm 57-59 (1969).
111. See the suggestions for a more "guaranteed" form of "public" representation
in the regulatory process in Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L.
REv. 1069, 1094-106 (1971).
112. See Boyer, supra note 92, at 137-64. It seems that Boyer is assuming away
the type of problems discussed in this note, see note 78 supra, when he says:
On the theoretical level, it seems likely that most of the problems confront-
ing administrative agencies would prove capable of solution through applica-
tion of general principles-if social-value preferences where sufficiently estab-
lished so that the choice among conflicting policies applicable to a given matter
were clear ....
Id. at 118-19. It is precisely where the social preferences are not clear before the agency
decides and where the agency has been delegated the task of constructing such a prefer-
ence function that the problems discussed herein arise. It is not possible to talk about
"optimal tradeoffs" between conflicting values, see id. at 138, and alternative institutional
arrangements to trial-type hearings being more likely to achieve "accurate" decisions
until such a social preference function has been decided upon.
It might be argued that it is theoretically possible to develop a preference function
through "value-free" methods of cost/benefit analysis. The theory would be that all
social values involved are reduced to a common unit of measurement and the alternative
choices involving the values arranged in order of their net social "payoffs." One objec-
tion to such a theory is that the process of scaling and assigning weights to the different
social values in order to reduce them to a common denominator will in fact be a less than
neutral process. See id. at 140. But even were this not true, we would still not have
a value-free preference function because a "redistribution of income" will almost in-
evitably result. Even if the total net social payoff is greatest when, for example, an
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determination is one which is capable of being rationally evaluated in
terms of "correctness" because the societal value structure has already
been determined, either by an elaborate statute, past agency development
of generalized standards, or, more improbably, a true social consensus."
It should be obvious, however, that the solutions to such problems
lie beyond the capacity of the federal judiciary as an institution. Con-
sidering the effective limits of the federal courts under Article III of the
Constitution,114 this evolving approach seems to be an extremely imagina-
tive response to a set of serious problems. Cries will be heard of delay and
hindrance of administrative efficiency as administrative determinations
are overturned on methodological grounds. What must be understood,
however, is that efficiency is a meaningless objective until the relevant
conflicting values have been fitted into a system of social priorities. By
insisting that the agencies develop and utilize a hierarchy of social values,
these judicial techniques-will not only secure more democratic influence
over some of our governing institutions, but should also make these in-
stitutions more efficient in a meaningful sense.115
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electrical generating project is located at a given site as opposed to any other alternative,
the distribution of this net payoff will be uneven, and it would be an unusual case where
some significant groups do not end up as clear net losers. This decision and resulting
redistribution arguably should not be made without some input by the affected groups in
a more expanded decisionmaking process. The neutral prescriptions of welfare eco-
nomics are limited, see, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIc THEORY AND OPER.AToNs ANALYsIs
375-85 (2d ed. 1965) (a short survey and critique of this area), and even then, they are
not usually followed. See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
Thus, a political choice among the competing values of varying interest groups remains
inevitable. For a more fundamental criticism of cost/benefit analysis as applied to com-
plex social and economic problems see Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2
PHILOS. & PuB. AFFAIRS 66 (1972), where the author concludes there is a need for
greater emphasis on social processes for conflict resolution.
113. During the great depression and the resulting New Deal, the great expansion
of the administrative process took place. It seems a defensible thesis that, at that time,
there was a general social consensus on the purposes (economic recovery and growth)
of the administrative process regardless of whether elaborated in the enabling statutes.
Any policy or value conflicts were generally deemed to be subordinated to this overrid-
ing objective. Consequently, it is less surprising that no well-developed constitutional
theory was developed to underlie the administrative process, and that pressures for shifts
in the relationship between the administrative process and the three traditional branches
of government are being felt in a period of much less social consensus with respect to
competing and conflicting social values.
114. U.S. Const. art. III.
115. See generally, SImoN, supra note 78, at 172-97.
[T]he administrator, serving a public agency in a democratic state, must
give a proper weight to all community values that are relevant to his activity,
and that are reasonably ascertainable in relation thereto, and cannot restrict
himself to values that happen to be his particular responsibility. Only under
these conditions can a criterion of efficiency be validly postulated as a deter-
minant of action.
Id. at 186 (emphasis in original).
